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PARCEL 1 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Description of Property in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint for the purpose of Quieting Title 
Beginning at a point which is North 53.21 feet and East 202.62 feet 
from the North quarter corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point being in the 
center of Big Cottonwood Creek; thence South 25.97 feet; thence 
S 70° W 112.86 feet; thence N 58°40' E 124.16 feet to the point 
of beginning. Containing 0.032 Acre (1377 square feet). 
PARCEL 2 
Beginning at a point which is South 98.05 feet from the North 
quarter corner of Section 8 Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, said point being in the center of Big 
Cottonwood Creek; thence N 48°05' E along the center of said 
creek a distance of 129.77 feet; thence S 26° W 224.40 feet; 
thence N 86° W 132.00 feet; thence S 74° W 23.18 feet; thence 
North 48.00 feet to the center of the beforementioned creek; 
thence N 73°20' E 72.31 feet; thence N 63°20' E 96.79 feet to 
the point of beginning. Containing 0.389 Acre (16,936 square feet) 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES He STRATFORD, 
and ROBERT L. HARRIS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
VS. 
EARL P. MORGAN, EARL D. 
MORGAN, GLORIA M. BROADBENT, 
EVELYN M. NEVILLE and 
ALICE M. TIMMERMAN, 
Defendants-Respondents.: 
Case No. 18306 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The defendants-respondents agree basically with the 
plaintiffs-appellants' statement of the kind of case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The respondents agree with the disposition of the lower 
court, but hold that in addition, the said appellants failed to 
meet the burden of proof and failed to establish any of the elements 
of boundary line by acquiescence as required under the guidelines 
of the previous decisions of the Utah Supreme Courto 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants seek to affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as presented by the appellants, 
needs further explanation. When L. H. Stratford and Ella Stratford 
purchased the property on March 10, 1951, only a small portion of 
their land was bounded by Big Cottonwood Creek. The drawing and 
layout, as set forth on Exhibit "A" of Respondents' brief, fairly 
illustrates and sets forth the area of dispute with particular 
attention from the common points of beginning of appellants' and 
respondents' land with the same north quarter corner, section 8, 
Township 2· South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. At 
the time of the purchase of the Stratford property in the spring 
of 1951, the evidence is clear there was no partial fence in 
existence along the south bank of Cottonwood Creek, but there was 
an interior fence approximately 150 feet south of Cottonwood 
stream on the south side of the creek and the said Morgans were 
using it in relationship to their farm for a long period of time 
prior to the purchase of the Stratfords. What the Stratfords did 
in 1951 was to remove the interior fence 150 feet South of Cotton-
wood Creek, which was in a state of disrepair and place a new 
fence along the south bank of Cottonwood Creek and the defendants' 
father, who had just lost his wife, and was in poor health, not 
being able to defend himself, did not bring an action for the 
removal of the Stratfords or their ejectment at that time. 
From an examination of the record, pursuant to Exhibit 
28, which is attached, the same north quarter corner of Section 8, 
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Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian was 
used to measure the boundary line between the plaintiffs' and 
defendants' land. It appears rather conclusively from the abstract, 
Exhibit 28, and from its examination that from the time of the 
patenting of the land to 1906 that Cottonwood Stream was wandering 
or meandering some period of time, and the parties at that time 
were attempting to measure their properties from the center of Big 
Cottonwood Creek. After 1906, no predecessor in title of either 
the plaintiffs or the defendants, ever again used the center of 
Big Cottonwood Creek for their metes and bounds description of the 
property. It might be well to point out that the parties did not 
use "Big Cottonwood Creek as a measuring device, but used metes 
and bounds and then described that as being in the center of 
Cottonwood Creek." But after 1906 none of the parties ever mentioned 
Big Cottonwood Creek in relationship to the surveys of their 
property. It appears that all of the parties were using metes 
and bounds after 1906 and each one was occupying their property by 
their metes and bounds description after that period of time. 
On May 23, 1979, Charles Stratford had his property 
surveyed and the land set forth from the North quarter corner 
of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian which indicates that his property line was 150 feet 
South of Big Cottonwood Creek and that his predecessors' title, 
as they had conveyed it to him from 1874, had located their 
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boundary line approximately 150 feet south of Big Cottonwood 
Creek. In fact an examination of the record and the stipulations 
by opposing counsel during the trial were as follows: 
1. That the said plaintiffs-appellants were not claiming 
any land by the doctrine of adverse possession. (R. 123) This was 
merely a confirmation of previous stipulations in court chambers 
prior to the commencement of the trial. 
2. In the record, (R. 166) counsel for Stratfords, Mr. 
West, stated to the court: 
"MR. WEST: I would like to make a motion at this 
time to amend the complaint to conform with the 
evidence that has been presented in the case; and 
amend the complaint to add an additional cause of 
action based upon adverse possession. I think the 
evidence shows that there has been possession of 
this property since the year 1951. The evidence 
also shows that the tax notice has come out with 
the deed description on the tax notice; but the 
acreages as shown on those tax notices is in 
excess of what the deed description is, which to 
me indicates that there have been taxes paid on 
the entire parcel. 
THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. West. Do I under-
stand the tax notices do not include the disputed 
portion in their metes and bounds description? 
MR. WEST: That's correct." 
The court then went on to say, in the record on page 174: 
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. West, first to your motion 
to include adverse possession I am going to deny 
that because I specifically asked whether you were 
asserting adverse possession and you indicated you 
were not. 
"Secondly, I think that with the description on the 
tax notice it wouldn't be sufficient to constitute 
adverse possession without describing the property 
in question. It leaves it too ambiguous as to 
whether the other portion of the acreage is. 
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The court then ruled in effect that boundary line by acquiescence 
had not been established by the plaintiffs because the boundary 
line, by their own evidence, was not in doubt, had never been in 
dispute and there was no conflict in reference to the same. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
OF BOUNDARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE AND THE COURT 
PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
We do not dispute the basic facts as set forth in 
Baum vs. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, (Utah 1974), Fuoco vs. Williams, 
421 P.2d 944, (Utah 1966), which states as follows: 
"In former opinions this court has required four 
prerequesites to establish a presumption of 
boundary by acquiescence. They are: (1) occu-
pation up to a visible line marked by monuments, 
fences or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in 
the line as the boundary, (3) for a long period 
of years, (4) by adjoining landowners.'' 
The first case to deal with this problem is Brown v. 
Milliner, 232 P.2d 202 (Utah 1951), where the court stated as 
follows: 
"A review of the Utah cases involving boundary 
disputes reveals that it has long been recognized in 
this state that when the location of the true 
boundary between two adjoining tracts of land is 
unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof 
may, by parol agreement, establish the boundary 
line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and 
their grantees. . .. In the latter case this court· 
pointed out that when the location of the true boun-
dar is known to the ad"oinin owners an arol a ree-
ment between them establishing the boun ary e se-
where would be an attempt to transfer an interest 
realty without complying with the statute of frauds. 
- c: -
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But, we stated, if the location of the true boundary 
is not known to the adjoining owners, a parol agree-
ment between them fixing its location is not regarded 
as transferring an interest in land but merely deter-
mining the location of existing estates. (emphasis 
added) 
"We have further held in this state that in the 
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining 
property or their predecessors in interest ever 
expressly agreed as to the location of the boun-
dary between them, if they have occupied their 
respective premises up to an open boundary line 
visibly marked by monuments, fences or bui~dings 
for a long period of time and mutually recognized 
it as the dividing line between them, the law will 
imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, 
if it can do so consistently with the facts 
appearing, and will not permit the parties nor 
their grantees to depart from such lineo" 
The final later pronouncement of this court is in the case 
of John Joseph Madsen vs. Darrell L. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726, Utah 
(1981), with facts identically the same as in this case. The 
Supreme Court stated: 
"The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has long 
been recognized, and when the location of the true 
boundary between adjoining tracts of land is un-
known, uncertain or in dis ute, the owners thereof 
may, y para agreement, estab is the boundary 
line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and 
their grantees. However, when the true boundary 
is known, an arol a reement of the owners estab-
lis in the boundar elsewhere is void and unen orce-
able b virtue o the o frauds, which 
requires a conveyance o property to be in writing. 
"This court has determined that in the absence of 
an express agreement as to the location of the boundary 
between adjoining owners, the law will imply an 
agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do 
so consistently with the facts appearing. However, 
when the evidence fails to support any implication 
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that a fence has been erected by adjoining owners pur-
suant to an agreement between them as to the location 
of the boundary between them, the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence has no application. In an earlier 
case, this court cautioned: 
"'We do not wish to be understood as holding 
that the parties may not claim to the true 
boundary, where an assumed or agreed boundary 
is located through mistake or inadvertance, 
or where it is clear that the line as located 
was not intended as a boundary, and where a 
boundary so located has not been acquiesced 
in for a long term of years by the parties 
in interest. [emphasis added.]' 
In the instant case, plaintiff showed that no uncer-
tainty or dispute existed concerning the location of 
boundary line at the time the 1904 fence was con-
structed. The 1904 deeds to plaintiff's and defen-
dant's predecessors unmistakably define a boundary 
which takes a substantial job northward at its 
eastern end. Defendant has raised no question con~ 
cerning the validity of these deeds; nor has he shown 
any subsequent conveyance by plaintiff or his father 
which might cast doubt on plaintiff's present title. 
The trial court did not include in its findings any 
indication that the boundary was disputed when 
plaintiff's father built the fence or that the 
fence was intended originally as a boundary line. 
In the absence of any initial uncertainty concerning 
the ownership of the property in question, the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has no appli-
cation." 
From the application of the Madsen v. Clegg, supra, 
above, the following identical facts and circumstances are very 
apparent in this case as to the plaintiffs and defendants: 
1. There is no question as to the validity of any 
deeds of the plaintiff or the defendants or their predecessors in 
title. 
2. There was no question as to validity of the survey 
or surveys or the metes and bounds descriptions of the respective 
plaintiffs' and defendants' land from the north quarter corner, 
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Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. Counsel for plaintiffs stipulated in open court (R. 
169): 
"THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this, sir; and it 
may be it's in evidence, I don't know. If you look 
at the Morgan description on the south side of the 
Morgan description and the north part of the Stratford 
descriptions, metes and bounds descriptions on the 
respective deeds, do they coincide? 
"MR. WEST: It's my understanding that the descriptions 
do in fact coincide." 
3. There is no evidence of any agreement between the 
Stratfords and the Morgans, Mrs. L .. H. Stratford, plaintiff, as 
grantee in the original deed, never did claim any such agreement 
and neither did her son. 
4. There are no subsequent conveyances by either the 
Morgans or the Stratfords, which might cast doubt on the plaintiffs' 
present title. 
5. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs' father 
ever built the fence with the intention that it be a boundary 
line, or the defendants' father ever agreed that it was to be the 
boundary line. 
6. There was no evidence in the record that the own-
ership of either the plaintiffs' property or the defendants' pro-
perty or any of their predecessors in title as to ownership was 
ever in doubt, uncertain or in dispute. 
7. There is no evidence of any payment of taxes by 
the plaintiffs and as the court pointed out, the description on the 
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tax notice would not be sufficient to constitute adverse possession 
without describing the property in question (R. 174). 
8. Prior to the purchase of the property by the 
Stratfords in 1951, the Morgans had used it as a pasture and 
planted it to grass and other forage crops for their cattle 
(R.159). From sunnnary of all of the cases that have been decided 
by the Supreme Court in this area, which are as follows: 
Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, (Utah 1974) 
Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (Utah, 1974) 
Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d 944 (Utah, 1966) 
Motzkus v. Carroll, 322 P.2d 391 (Utah 1958) 
Anderson Vo Osguthorpe, 504 P.2d 1000 (Utah, 1972) 
Holmes v. Judge 87P. 809 (1906) 
Peterson v. Johnson, 34 P.2d 697 (Utah 1934) 
Can be sunnnarized as to certain basic facts in reference to the 
application of Boundary Line by Acquiescence, that where the true 
boundary line is known, any parole agreement establishing the 
boundary elsewhere is void and unenforceable by the statute of 
frauds which requires the conveyance of real property to be in 
writing, see also Madsen v. Clegg, supra. 
9. That from a long period of time of usage, the court 
will imply an agreement between the owners, but where the evidence 
fails to support any implication that the fence has been erected 
by joining landowners pursuant to an agreement, the doctrine of 
Boundary Line by Acquiescence has no applica~ion. In this case 
the trial court by stipulation between counsel and opponents, deter-
mined that the boundary line between the parties was not in dispute. 
There was no agreement between the property owners as to the 
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location of a boundary line and there was no evidence to support 
an implication that the fence had been erected by the adjoining 
landowners pursuant to agreement. Therefore, based upon the 
evidence introduced by the plaintiff himself in support of his 
Complaint to quiet title, it utterly failed from the facts of his 
own presentation. There was no need for the defendants to proceed 
because it would have only corroborated the plaintiffs' own 
testimony and his own witnesses as to the facts and circumstances, 
as to the conclusion there was basically no dispute as to the 
boundary line. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN SUSTAINING AN 
OBJECTION TO THE PLAINTIFFS' PROFERRED EVIDENCE. 
The Title Opinion. During the course of the trial, the 
defendant attempted to introduce a title opinion in 1951, by 
Stephens, Brayton & Lowe concerning some early conveyances which 
tied the north boundary of the property to Big Cottonwood Creek. 
Of course, this was merely an attorney's opinion, which in no way 
could be binding upon the defendants and was not in any way 
offered as an exception to the hearsay rule and was clearly within 
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence, which states as follows: 
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than 
by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered 
to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay 
evidence and inadmissible, except:" 
Also the letter states: "Most of the early conveyances 
tie the North boundary to the center of Cottonwood Creek." It 
goes on to say: 
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"The last deed referring to the Cottonwood Creek 
as a boundary is dated in 1906." 
The problem here is that somehow the plaintiffs are claiming the 
center of Big Cottonwood Creek is the boundary line, by the Stephens, 
Brayton & Lowe attorneys' opinion, but his boundary line by acquies-
cence is a fence on the south side of Big Cottonwood Creek. This 
is confusing and is a claim for two different boundary lines. 
Again, it cannot be stressed too clearly that an examina-
tion of the plaintiffs' abstract (Ex. 28) on page 11 of Orson 
Sanders to Asa D. Reynolds, on November 12, 1906, which is the 
last time Cottonwood Creek was ever mentioned, does not mention 
the boundary line as being Cottonwood Creek, but gives metes and 
bounds and then mentions one of the calls as being in the "center 
of Big Cottonwood Creek." Again, not to be too repetitious, Big 
Cottonwood Creek was never used as a boundary line as such, but 
was mentioned in some of the calls as being the location line of 
the metes and bounds descriptions. 
Also,. at best there is no evidence that Mr. Morgan ever 
had any knowledge as to the same, that this was brought to his 
attention, or that any claim was ever made or that this was an 
area of dispute and the whole opinion is based mostly on "You 
state that the Creek bed has changed'' which is merely a self-
serving statement by L. H. Stratford, which has no application in 
this case and was without foundation. 
Correspondence with Salt Lake County. Again, the 
correspondence with Salt Lake County was clearly within Rule 63, 
Rules of Evidence, and was hearsay, self-serving, and 
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immaterial. There is no evidence that Salt Lake County ever 
examined the title of the plaintiffs or defendants and that what 
Salt Lake County's letter may have been on is other people's pro-
perty two miles up the stream or two miles down the stream or what 
others may have used, and based upon that without any further 
evidence or foundation, the court very properly, on the basis of 
(1) lack of foundation, (2) hearsay, and (3) self-serving. 
The plaintiffs cite the case of Durfey v. Board of 
Education df Wayne County, 604 P.2d 480 (Utah 1979) and Webb v. 
Webb, 253 P.2d 372 (Utah 1949) and 29 Am Jur 2d, §497. These 
cases we state may very well be pertinent to show the mental state 
of mind of a person, but there is no evidence here from any 
assertions what the state of mind of L. H. Stratford was other 
than deciding to appropriate defendants' land on his own, without 
any basis of misunderstanding, or confusion in either his abstract, 
his title, or his deeded conveyances. 
Testimony from Mrs. Stratford. Again, the objection as 
to Ella Stratford's testimony, what she understood the boundary line 
to be, at Big Cottonwood Creek, is hearsay, immaterial, without 
foundation and a conclusion. Without any of the basic approaches 
of the introduction of the testimony, the court very properly did 
not allow the evidence in on the basis as to plaintiffs as they 
proposed their questions and as it related to the testimony of 
this witness. 
-12-
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POINT III 
THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WAS PROPER. 
The Judgment of the court decreed that the plaintiffs 
had no fee simple title in certain property described by metes and 
bounds as set forth in the "plaintiffs' complaint". (Exhibit B) An 
analysis 9£ the plaintiffs' complaint (R. 2) requests the court to 
quiet title in Charles H. Stratford and Robert L. Harris because 
they were fee title owners to Parcels 1 and Parcel 2. The Complaint 
then states in paragraph 2, (R. 2) that the defendants claim an 
interest. Paragraph 3 (R. 3) states that they are claiming title 
by virtue of acquiescence in the fence and stream and boundary 
line. 
It, therefore, appears that the basic allegations of the 
plaintiffs' Complaint claims that they were the fee title owners 
in Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 and by their own evidence they failed to 
establish that they had any fee title or record title to Parcels 1 
and 2. The map of the property of which they seek to quiet title 
is set forth as an exhibit to this Complaint, see illustration, 
Exhibit "A", Description Exhibit "B". 
The plaintiffs now claim that the decree caused a portion 
of the property occupied by the plaintiffs to be transferred to 
the defendants because defendants had no interest in the property. 
This is merely a conclusion on their part. They fail to realize 
that in bringing a quiet title action that they must rely on the 
strength of their title and not because of any weakness alleged in 
, "1 
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the defendants. The pronouncement of this court in Olsen v. Park 
Daughters Investment Company, 511 P.2d 145 (Utah 1973) states the 
general law very clearly in this matter. 
''In analyzing the plaintiffs' attack upon the findings 
and judgment it is appropriate to have in mind these 
basic propositions: In order for them to prevail, 
plaintiffs had the burden of proof to establish their 
case, and to persuade the trial court; and particu-
larly in this action to quiet title, this had to be 
done on the strength of their own title and not be-
cause of any weakness in that of the defendants." 
Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P.2d 862 (1939); 
Mercur Coalition Mining Company v. Cannon, 112 Utah 
13, 184 P.2d 341 (1947); 
Smith v. DeNiro, 26 Utah 2d 153, 486 P.2d 1036 (1971) 
The said defendants failed to prove that they had any record title 
and failed to prove that they had title by boundary line by 
acquiescence or any other title upon which to base their quiet 
title action. Therefore, the trial court's determination of the 
form of the judgment is proper and is proper under the existing 
law. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM WITH THE EVIDENCE. 
The plaintiffs' allegations of error in Point IV are 
very confusing and hard to comprehend under existing principles 
of law. They don't claim mistake, they don't claim inadvertance, 
they don't claim surprise, they don't claim improper conduct on 
the part of the judge. They are somehow claiming that they mis-
read the existing case law as to boundary line by acquiescence 
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and, therefore, based upon misunderstanding of ·the law of boundary 
line by acquiescence they now want to proceed on a new theory, 
having stated expressly to the court that that was not the basis 
upon which they were proceeding, either by their complaint or by 
their action on the day of the trial. 
Upon reading the complaint (R. 2) they commenced an 
action to quiet title alleging they were the fee simple title 
owners of the disputed land, which they were plainly not. They 
did not claim that they had paid taxes, which would have been 
required by adverse possession, or any other basis upon the land 
which they were entitled to. 
follows: 
On page 123 of the record, the court plainly stated as 
"THE COURT: I understand you are not claiming 
adverse possession, only claiming boundary by 
acquiescence? 
MR. WEST: Claiming boundary by acquiescence. And 
I would offer plaintiffs' Exhibit 31." 
It is not until the conclusion of the case that after everything 
had taken place that the plaintiff then made a motion to amend 
the complaint for adverse possession. 
The court stated to Mr. West on page 174 of the record: 
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. West, first to your motion 
to include adverse possession I am going to deny 
that because I specifically asked whether you were 
asserting adverse possession and you indicated you were 
not. 
"Secondly, I think that with the description on 
the tax notice it wouldn't be sufficient to con-
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stitute adverse possession without describing 
the property in question. It leaves it too ambi-
guous as to whether the other portion of the acreage 
is." 
There is no evidence that the plaintiffs ever paid any 
taxes on parcels 1 and 2 of which they requested the above entitled 
court to quiet title in their names and an examination of the tax 
notice very amply rules this. 
It is very elementary, although the said plaintiffs 
place some emphasis that the amount of land as shown on their tax 
title is greater than the amount as it is described in their deed, 
it is very clear that the land which they are claiming, now by 
adverse possession, does not include the land which they seek to 
quiet title on, parcels 1 and 2, but is included within the deeded 
description of the defendants, for which they had been paying 
taxes. 
It is now argued, by the plaintiffs, that although it 
was not offered in evidence, somehow if the amount of land described 
by Salt Lake County Assessor's office, is greater than the actual 
amount of land, as set forth in their deed, that thi~ extends over 
into defendants' land for which they have no title and for which 
they have paid no taxes. It is elementary that their tax notices 
coincide exactly with their legal description. They were paying 
taxes on no more or on no greater parcel of land than by their 
deeded tax description. The probable reason of the difference in 
their tax notice by quantity than their deeded description is 
probably based upon the fact that the original deed was from the 
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center of 4800 South. It could also be a computer or surveyor 
mistake in computation in the office of the co~nty assessor of 
Salt Lake County. There are more than a thousands reasons that 
might explain this particular discrepancy. It is again merely a 
question of speculation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments and the authorities as cited 
herein, it is respectfully urged that the judgment of the trial 
court be affirmed. It is also urged that the rulings on evidence 
were true, .correct and proper and should also be affirmed by this 
court. 
:;z~pe ·tful,ly,, su~mitted.. , / / , ,LC-:~1_ 7 4. ~ - J___ _/; ;,,,--. -W (l -~ , ~ ,, ' / ,!:;----- (._ 
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN ~ 
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